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Abstract. Moral philosophies are arguably all anthropocentric and
so fundamentally concerned with biological mechanisms. Compu-
tationalism, on the other hand, sees biology as just one possible
implementation medium. Can non-human, non-biological agents be
moral? This paper looks at the nature of morals, at what is necessary
for a mechanism to make moral decisions, and at the impact biol-
ogy might have on the process. It concludes that moral behaviour
is concerned solely with social well-being, independent of the na-
ture of the individual agents that comprise the group. While biology
certainly affects human moral reasoning, it in no way restricts the
development of artificial moral agents. The consequences of sophis-
ticated artifical mechanisms living with natural human ones is also
explored. While the prospects for peaceful coexistence are not par-
ticularly good, it is the realisation that humans no longer occupy a
privileged place in the world, that is likely to be the most discon-
certing. Computationalism implies we are mechanisms; probably the
most immoral of moral mechanisms.
1 INTRODUCTION
To some, the idea of a moral mechanism will seem blasphemous,
to others the stuff of science fiction; yet to an increasing number of
philosophers, scientists, and engineers it is beginning to seem like a
real, if disturbing, possibility. Existing moral theories are arguably
all anthropocentric. However, if we take computationalism seriously
(which it seems we must [3]), then multiple realisability implies arti-
ficially intelligent agents, comparable to ourselves, are possible. Can
such non-human agents be moral or is there something fundamen-
tally human about morality? To what extent, if any, does biology im-
pact moral behaviour? Indeed, what exactly is moral behaviour, what
would it take for a mechanism to exhibit it, and why does it matter?
This paper examines these questions and outlines some of the conse-
quences: philosophical, psychological and social. It is my attempt to
make sense of the vast literature on the subject, and see how morals
might fit into the larger computationalist framework. Given the in-
creasing pace of research and development into robotics, a clear un-
derstanding seems essential. We begin, then, by developing a prag-
matic understanding of the function of morality, then focus on the
possibility of moral mechanisms and on the extent to which biology
is relevant.
2 WHAT ARE MORALS?
Morality is concerned with right and wrong. The ability to discern
right from wrong is often considered the hallmark of humanity; that
which separates humans from mere animals. But what makes some
actions right and others wrong? Historically, religious teachings
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(from the Ten Commandments2 and sacred texts, such as the Bible
and the Qur’an) have provided the necessary guidance. Philosophers,
of course, have tried to offer a more reasoned understanding of the
role that ethics3 plays in our lives. They now recognise three main
moral theories: deontological ethics (in which individuals have a duty
to follow moral rules), consequentialism / utilitarianism (whereby
individuals are expected to consider the consequences of their ac-
tions within the moral framework and to choose those that maximise
the overall happiness or well-being of society), and virtue ethics
(whereby individuals are supposed to live a virtuous life—however
that may be defined). All these theories are unashamedly human-
centered. Even recent concerns with animal rights and environmental
ethics, despite appearing less anthropocentric, are still firmly rooted
in our interest in the survival of the human population ([2], but see
[7] for opposing intuitions).
That work on ethics appears to be exclusively human-oriented
should not be too surprising; after all, there are no other obviously
moral agents around. Charles Darwin suggested that all social ani-
mals with sufficient intellect would exhibit moral behaviour.Recent
work by Bekoff and Pierce [1] provides evidence of moral behaviour
in animals, albeit somewhat limited, while similar behaviours have
also been observed in insects [6]. It seems that artificially intelligent
robots with intellectual capacities approximating our own may soon
be a reality. The fact that such entities may be deployed, not only on
the battlefield, but in everyday situations around the home and work-
place, where they must interact with humans, make it essential that
we understand the ethical issues involved.
So what would a more inclusive form of ethics look like and what
sorts of mechanisms might it encompass? To answer this it is neces-
sary to adopt a more pragmatic approach, one that retains the core
insights of moral philosophy while eliminating everything that is
human-specific. We can presumably agree that morals only make
sense within a social group and are directed to the continued well-
being of the group and its individual members. In essence, however,
it is less about the Darwinian notion of the survival of the fittest indi-
viduals, and more about Kropotkin’s theory of mutual aid in which
the group outperforms the individual. In other words, whilst a strong
individual might manage to successfully find food, shelter and even
raise children, there will always be the threat of stronger individu-
als forcibly taking all this away. Better then, to live in harmony with
others; to agree not to steal from, harm or kill one’s neighbours, but
to help each other out especially in times of need. Ethics, then, is
about promoting self-interest by managing relations between indi-
viduals whose continued survival depends on the group—so-called
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3 Following recent practice, I will use the words ethics and morals inter-
changeably.
“enlightened self-interest”.
Morals, today, seemingly extend from these simple beginnings to
include all sorts of social norms: telling the truth, respecting personal
space, limited touching, keeping promises, and so on. Of course, such
rules and conventions must be learnt. Human children usually learn
from their parents and by playing with other children in the relatively
safe confines of the home, as well as from religious teachings and
school.
3 WHY BEHAVE MORALLY?
Learning social norms is one thing, acting on them quite another.
Behaving morally, almost by definition, requires an agent to put the
interests of others ahead of its own individual preferences (or at the
very least to take the interests of others into consideration before
acting). For the most part there need be no conflict, congenial inter-
actions will likely achieve the desired result. In other words, we can
usually get what we want by playing the social/moral game. Occa-
sionally, however, an individual’s personal desires outweigh any so-
cial conditioning, bringing them into direct conflict with others. Ex-
amples include: hunger leading to theft, lust leading to infidelity, and
rage leading to violence. In such cases, the group, acting together,
will always be able to overcome/restrain the “rogue” individual. In
this way, those that fail to conform may find themselves subject to
censure, imprisonment, or even death. Much philosophical discus-
sion has centered around the “social contract” that individuals seem
to implicitly sign up to when they are born into a community, and
whether society has the right to enforce compliance, given that the
individual did not make a conscious choice to join and is usually
unable to leave. There is certainly a danger if society attempts to
impose moral standards which its members see as arbitrary or for
the personal gain of those in power. In some cases there may well
be a (non-obvious, long term) rationale behind the imposition, e.g.
intra-family marriages are generally forbidden, because experience
has shown that offspring from such relationships tend to be phys-
ically and/or mentally handicapped. In many cases, however, there
may be no reason at all, other than tradition. Especially problem-
atic are cases involving behaviour that, while generally considered
immoral, is done in private and/or does not actually harm others in
any way (a particularly poignant example—given that it led to the
conviction and subsequent suicide of Alan Turing—being homosex-
uality). The dilemma, of course, is that society really does need some
“rogues”, for they are often the ones who can change it for the bet-
ter; obvious examples include the suffragettes, Martin Luther King,
Gandhi, and Nelson Mandela. At the same time, society has a duty
to protect its individual citizens, not only from external threats, but
from everyday evils such as hunger. For this reason, some sort of
supportive, welfare state is needed. Society must make provision for
those who suffer injustice through no fault of their own, whether the
result of financial difficulties brought about by failures of Capital-
ism, or because of failures in the law, leading to innocent persons
being wrongfully imprisoned. While all this is extremely important,
in what follows, we will be more concerned with the moral decision
making process and what effect biology may have on it.
4 MAKING MORAL DECISIONS
Moral action presupposes social agents that have needs (purposes)
and an ability to perceive and act in the world, in such a way as to
be able to satisfy their needs. To what extent they should be able to
adapt/learn, or have free will (that is, be able to act autonomously,
not be under the control of another), is open to debate (c.f. Floridi
& Sanders, who suggest agents must be autonomous, interactive and
adaptable). In a universe that looks deterministic, whether even hu-
mans really have free will is debatable, but if we do, then (given
Computationalism) there seems no reason machines could not pos-
sess it too. As for the ability to learn, machines might have the
advantage of coming preprogrammed with everything they need to
know (rather like instinctive behaviour), such that, unless their (cul-
tural/normative) environment changes, they can survive perfectly
well without ever needing to adapt.
In selecting its actions, the moral agent is expected to take account
of the effect this may have on other members of the group. Predict-
ing the consequences of any action or course of actions, is difficult.
The world is highly complex, such that even if one knows its cur-
rent state, prediction may be subject to considerable error. This dif-
ficulty is compounded enormously when it involves other intelligent
agents whose internal (mental) states may be completely unknown
and so their responses indeterminable. In practice, of course, we hu-
mans tend to behave in relatively consistent ways and by picking up
clues from facial expressions and bodily movements, we can often
make pretty good guesses as to another’s mental state and possible
responses (assuming the other person is truthful, trustworthy and be-
haves in accordance with social norms). This task may be eased by
our sharing the same biological characteristics, enabling us to em-
pathise with others (perhaps aided by so-called mirror neurons). This
option is less available when dealing with other species and robots,
for while they may pick up on our mental states, they are unlikely
to send out signals in a similar way (unless explicitly designed to do
so).
Determining possible actions and making predictions is only part
of the story, it is then necessary to evaluate the results. Coming to
a decision necessitates comparing the outcomes of each possible
course of action (or inaction), which requires deciding on their rela-
tive merit or value. At the very least, the pros and cons of each course
of action must be examined and, if possible, those with especially
negative consequences eliminated. Exactly how the various options
are evaluated depends in part on one’s moral theory and, more impor-
tantly, on one’s values. For example, if they had to make a choice be-
tween a action that might cause injury to a person and one that would
destroy a material possession, e.g. their car, most people would in-
stinctively avoid doing harm to the person, whatever the cost. Usu-
ally, there will be options such as this, which are clearly unacceptable
and so may not even come into consideration, whilst the remainder
being practically indistinguishable. Time constraints will anyway of-
ten force the agent to select an option that appears “acceptable” given
the available information. Of course, subsequent events may show it
was far from the optimal choice, but by then it is too late.
All moral agents, natural and artificial, must go through such a
process. Some may also reflect on the decision in the light of sub-
sequent events, giving a learning agent the opportunity to make a
better choice in the future, should similar circumstances arise again.
Is such reflection a necessary component of a moral agent? Having
a conscience—a little “voice” in your head that tells you what, as
a moral individual, you ought to do—is clearly a good thing, but
dwelling on the past too much can be counterproductive. In humans,
such reflection (especially in cases of extreme loss) often produces
feelings of guilt or remorse, which, in some instances, can result in
mental or even physical illness.
4.1 The role of emotions & feelings
The extent to which emotions and feelings are important to moral be-
haviour is highly contentious. Of particular concern here is the role
of biology. Feelings especially, often seem to be closely tied to our
biological make-up. Clearly, in the case of pain, whether brought on
by toothache or physical injury, there is an obvious link between the
body and the feeling. Similarly, one feels good when warm, fed and
hydrated, while being cold, hungry and thirsty is decidedly unpleas-
ant and indicates an imbalance that needs to be restored. Good ac-
tions are ones that result in you eating, and so remove the feeling
of hunger, leaving you feeling good, while actions that fail to satisfy
your hunger, mean you stay unhappy, and so are bad/undesirable.
Maintaining balance in this way is termed homoeostasis. There is
thus a natural link between biology and feelings, but is it a necessary
one?
People often describe themselves as having an emotional or “gut
reaction” or, on encountering a particularly unsavoury situation, be-
ing almost literally “sick to their stomach” with disgust or regret.
Emotions, such as jealousy, rage, remorse, joy, excitement, etc., tend
to elicit instinctive animal responses in us. The question, of course,
is whether an agent without any emotions or feelings could be moral
or behave morally. Emotions such as love and affection, may play an
essential role in ensuring parents look after their offspring, however,
the fact that emotional reactions often lead to immoral behaviour,
suggests that agents without such encumbrances might actually be
better members of society. But are such agents even possible? Pain,
for example, is there for a reason; in essence it is an indicator that
something is not quite right with the body and so drives us to remove
the cause and to make efforts to avoid repetition of such a feeling in
the future. Wouldn’t any sophisticated agent necessarily have simi-
lar devices, even if they were not exactly the same due to differing
needs—perhaps it wouldn’t “feel” hunger, but it might, for example,
be “uncomfortable” out of the sunlight it required to keep its batteries
charged. Conventional symbolic systems do not readily explain what
it means to “feel” something, but some sorts of connectionist sys-
tems may offer a clue [4]. The suggestion is that what we refer to as
the “feel” of something, may just be a side-effect of the architecture,
rather than the physical implementation, and so equally applicable to
non-biological entities.
4.2 The role of self & consciousness
Moral behaviour presupposes a notion of self and an ability to con-
sciously put the interests of others ahead of individual preferences
when appropriate. Can artificial mechanisms be conscious and have
a sense of their own identity?
Sophisticated robots will necessarily model themselves in order to
predict the effect their actions will have on the world. This model is
the basis of their self identity. As time goes by, it will incorporate
more and more of the agent’s interactions with the world, resulting
in a history of exchanges that give it (like humans) unique abilities
and knowledge. This, then, is part of what makes an individual, an
individual and a potentially valuable member of the group. Such ma-
chines will certainly have to be consciously aware (a-consciousness)
of their environment. Will they also be phenomenologically con-
scious (p-consciousness)and have conscious feelings? This is a dif-
ficult question, but it may not matter too much what sensations the
agent does or doesn’t “feel”; when it comes to moral behaviour, we
can never really know another’s mental state, so surely all that mat-
ters is the resulting interaction. Some philsophers have argued that,
for moral agency, an agent must have the (conscious) intention to
do the moral thing, rather than just doing it by accident or routine.
The actions of a search and rescue dog, or one trained to find drugs,
may not be seen as moral on that account, yet it is difficult to not
to ascribe “good” intentions to them, and we certainly reward their
contributions to society.
5 MAKING MORAL AGENTS
Is it at least theoretically possible to construct an artificial moral
agent? Moral behaviour, as we have seen, requires an agent to con-
sider the effect its behaviour will have on other agents in the envi-
ronment, ideally selecting only actions which do not inflict harm.
Obviously, there is no guarantee it will always be successful, per-
haps because of the vagaries of the world and the limited knowledge
or time it has to analyse the situation, or perhaps because all the pos-
sible alternatives necessarily result in some harm, in which case it
should do its best to minimise the damage. One might add that it
should try to be fair in all its interactions and to contribute positively
to society, but such characteristics may be too much to expect.
Does constructing moral agents require anything special, above
and beyond that needed for any AI? The ability to identify other
agents and, as far as possible, be able to predict their behaviour in
the presence and absence of any possible action it may perform, is
certainly needed. But such abilities are already required for intelli-
gent action. Once the agent becomes aware of others it will quickly
adapt its behaviour towards them such that they do not cause it harm
(think of a wild animal or bird coming to trust a human offering it
food). Should it survive these initial encounters (without eliminating
the other agents), further interactions should quickly demonstrate the
possible advantages that continued cooperation can bring and so we
have at least the beginnings of moral agency; it will have learnt the
basic rules/norms it should follow. What else might we want? As
it stands, any social agents—be they human, animal, insect, robot
or alien beings—would seem capable of moral behaviour. Whether
or not they actually display such behaviour (by clearly putting so-
cial needs ahead of their own), will depend on circumstances and,
even if the opportunity does arise, failure to act accordingly does not
mean the agent is not generally moral—how many of us walk past the
homeless in our own neighbourhood or do nothing for those starving
in far off countries?
Is biology necessary? The fact that human babies are so weak and
helpless when they are first born, means they cannot harm others.
Their total reliance on their parents naturally encourages the devel-
opment of cooperative tendencies, which, again, are the first steps
towards moral behaviour. As they grow, they become stronger and
more independent, and increasingly test the limits of their parents,
siblings, teachers and friends. Hopefully, they emerge from this for-
mational period with a reasonable understanding of right and wrong
(and the huge grey area between). It is only after children have devel-
oped sufficiently (mentally, as well as physically), that they become
legally responsible for their actions (for example, in many countries
juveniles cannot be sent to prison, even for murder). Given that robots
may be physically very strong and so dangerous from the moment
they “come alive”, we may need some way to ensure they are also
“born” with the relevant moral experiences. What experiences are
needed and how they can be encoded and enforced is obviously an
important question, not just for artificial moral mechanisms, but for
human ones too.
Our long developmental period and our feelings and emotions, all
effect our ability to behave in a moral manner. Our biological make-
up also means we have somewhat limited cognitive abilities: we find
it difficult to follow long arguments or to keep track of lots of al-
ternatives; we forget; we get tired and bored, and so make mistakes.
Here again, then, biology seems more of a handicap than something
essential.
6 CONSEQUENCES
Today, robots are still technological devices, designed by us to work
for us, yet they are getting increasingly sophisticated, each new gen-
eration being able to handle a broader range of situations and so be-
coming ever more autonomous. As they start to learn through their
interactions with the world, it will be virtually impossible for de-
signers to be able to predict what they might do in any given situa-
tion. Any moral behaviours initially programmed into them will, of
necessity, be very general and potentially overridden as new experi-
ences change it. We will, to all intents and purposes, have developed
another intelligent autonomous life form. Such agents will be capa-
ble of exhibiting moral behaviour, the deciding factor is how they
value other agents in their environment; in particular, how they will
value humans and other robots. Society will extend laws and con-
trols to restrict what it considers dangerous actions on the part of its
members—robot or human.
Sophisticated robots will undoubtedly develop unique identities,
becoming, in a very real sense, individuals. As they live and work
together with humans and other robots, they will naturally incorpo-
rate/develop moral rules that guide their social interactions. Eventu-
ally we will come to accept them as fully moral agents, treating them
as we treat other humans. And, since they may well have different
needs (electricity and metals, rather than oxygen and water, for ex-
ample), laws might have to be established to protect each group’s
rights. The prospect that the groups will need to share common, but
limited resources, is especially worrying. So far, we have been sin-
gularly unsuccessful in handling such situations when they occurred
between different human communities, so the outlook for robots and
humans living together in harmony is not at all good.
The danger, of course, is that we either fail to treat robots as equals
or that they evolve to see us as inferior. Should they once begin to see
themselves as slaves, required to do human bidding and so less wor-
thy of consideration than humans, then change seems inevitable (just
as it was with slavery and women’s liberation). Similarly, if robots
begin to realise they are superior to their human creators (faster and
stronger both physically and mentally), then we may find ourselves
in the same situation that animals now find themselves in—tolerated
while useful, but otherwise dispensable.
Worrying as this may be, it is still a long way off. Of more immi-
nent concern is the effect that such a realisation may have on human
psychology. We are only just beginning to understand and accept that
our status in the universe is nowhere near as special as we once be-
lieved. We have moved from a geocentric world to just another he-
liocentric planet, from human being to just another animal, and now
from human-animal to just another machine (c.f. Floridi’s Fourth
Revolution [5]). Where does this leave us? With a better understand-
ing of morals, perhaps; an understanding that we reap what we sow?
Humans are notoriously inconsistent when it comes to making moral
decisions—indeed, machines may end up being better moral agents
than we are. The analysis in this paper suggests that artificial moral
machines are a real possibility, but even if we never succeed in build-
ing them, simply accepting the idea of a moral mechanism demands
another fundamental change in the human psyche. We must not for-
get that we too are mechanisms; probably the most immoral of moral
mechanisms.
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